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Abstract—Hash functions are considered key components of 
nearly all cryptographic protocols, as well as of many security 
applications such as message authentication codes, data integrity, 
password storage, and random number generation. Many hash 
function algorithms have been proposed in order to ensure 
authentication and integrity of the data, including MD5, SHA-1, 
SHA-2, SHA-3 and RIPEMD. This paper involves an overview of 
these standard algorithms, and also provides a focus on their 
limitations against common attacks. These study shows that these 
standard hash function algorithms suffer collision attacks and 
time inefficiency. Other types of hash functions are also 
highlighted in comparison with the standard hash function 
algorithm in performing the resistance against common attacks.  
It shows that these algorithms are still weak to resist against 
collision attacks. 
Keywords—Hash function algorithms; MD5; PRIMEDS160; 
SHA-1; SHA-2; SHA-3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the most useful primitives that are crucial for data 
security is the cryptographic hash function, which offers 
message authentication, data integrity, and digital signature 
[1]-[3]. Additionally, it is employed as a core element of 
cryptographic protocols, secure transactions and crypto-
currencies. Fig. 1 presents an output of a fixed length (termed 
as a message digest or hash code) that uses a one-way function 
(known as a hash function) with an input of arbitrary length 
(also termed as a ―message‖ or ―plain text‖) [4]. 
 
Fig. 1. Hash function. 
The mathematical definition of a hash function (H) is 
defined as follows: 
H: {0, 1}* → {0, 1}n             (1) 
Where, {0, 1}* refers to the set of binary elements of any 
length including the empty string. Meanwhile, {0, 1}n is used 
to refer to a set of binary elements with length n. Thus, a set of 
fixed-length binary elements is mapped to arbitrary-length 
binary elements using the hash function. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Sections II 
and III, the basic concepts such as security properties and 
applications of hash functions are discussed. A literature 
review on the most popular hash function algorithms is 
provided in Section IV. Then, the comparison of the standard 
hash algorithm based on the general properties and common 
attacks are discussed in Section V. Many researchers have also 
proposed their own algorithms as discussed in Section VI. 
II. PROPERTIES OF HASH FUNCTIONS 
Several properties of security must be satisfied for 
cryptographic hash functions [5], [6]. 
A. Resistance to Collision Attacks 
It would be impossible for the attacker to find the same 
hash value or H(M) for two messages (M, M’). A collision 
attack happens when a pair of distinct messages having the 
same hash as shown in Fig. 2. The hash function must have 
the property of not producing same hash value for different 
messages. 
 
Fig. 2. Collision resistance. 
B. Resistance to Pre-Image Attacks 
A preimage is a message that hashes to a given value. In a 
preimage attack, it is usually assumed that at least one 
message that hashes to the given value exists as shown in 
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Fig. 3. Therefore, to be resistance to pre-image attacks, one 
often says that the adversary (also called the attacker) is given 
y = H(M) for some (randomly chosen) message M, which the 
attacker does not know. In other words, the attacker should 
find it is not possible to gain original data (or message (M)) 
from a given hash value H(M). 
 
Fig. 3. Preimage resistance. 
C. Resistance to Second Pre-Image Attacks 
A second preimage is a message that hashes to the same 
value as a given (randomly chosen) message, called the first 
preimage. Obviously, the second preimage must be different 
from the first. Here, we assume that the attacker is also given 
the hash value of the first preimage. If not, then the attacker 
can compute it himself. In the latter case the cost of hashing 
the first preimage is placed on the attacker, which we do not 
assume here. A brute force preimage attack can also be used to 
find a second preimage. 
One simply ignores the first preimage, except that one may 
take care not to try a message that is identical to the first 
preimage. By selecting messages at random, assuming that the 
domain of the hash function is much larger than the co-
domain, the probability of the second preimage being equal to 
the first is negligible, and therefore we usually ignore this 
possibility. Due to the above attack, finding a second 
preimage seems to never be harder than finding a (first) 
preimage. However, there are artificial constructions that 
allow preimages to be found in constant time, but which are 
collisions and second preimage resistant. 
Fig. 4 shows that the hash value H(M) could change with 
the slightest change in message (M). In summary, it should be 
impossible for an attacker—which has been given a message 
to obtain the original digest after manipulating it. 
 
Fig. 4. Second preimage resistance. 
Besides these properties, the hash function should also be 
able to work and calculate the digest for any input message of 
any size; the hash calculation process must be efficient. 
III. APPLICATIONS OF HASH FUNCTION 
Hash functions are used in many applications such as 
digital signature, message integrity, and authentication. This 
section discussed these applications. 
A. Digital Signature 
This is the first application of a secure hash function, it is a 
mathematical scheme used to validate the authenticity of the 
sender, message and signer of the document identity. In cases 
where it is crucial that an altered document or message is 
detected, or in any financial transaction, digital signature is 
commonly implemented. The signature for a document is 
produced via public and private keys utilized by the Digital 
Signature. This indicates that without authorization, it is 
difficult for another person to duplicate the document or 
message created by the person who had signed it first [7]. 
B. Message Integrity 
Integrity checking is the foremost and fundamental 
objective of the hash function, which allows the detection of 
any changes being made to the data. The integrity of a 
message that is transmitted is checked via the sender, who 
hashes the message, whereby both hash value and message are 
sent. The message is generally sent from an insecure line, and 
only sometimes from a secure one. The received message is 
hashed from the side of the receiver, who checks the received 
hash value against the resulting hash value. The preservation 
of the message depends on whether or not the two hash values 
match; a match indicates preservation while a mismatch 
indicates non-preservation. There is a very low possibility that 
hash value and message are both altered (the hash value of the 
altered message is the altered hash value). 
C. Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
In constructions involving the Message Authentication 
Code (MAC), hash functions are popularly used as building 
blocks. Verification of identical sent and received messages 
can be done using the Message Authentication Code. 
However, only the sender or the recipient can compute the 
MAC. Therefore, identity verification of a sender to a third 
party cannot be executed using MAC. A keyed-hash function 
(which includes a keyed-in addition input to the message) is 
used to compute the MAC. The key must be kept secret or the 
operation will fail. Although third parties will not be privy to 
this key (kept secret from them), the same key must be used 
from the recipient and sender side. In the process of 
generating a MAC, any applicable constant string and hash 
function is used for the sender to input message and key. This 
is followed with the sending of the message and generated 
MAC to the receiver. The same hash function and algorithm is 
used on behalf of the receiver to generate a MAC of the 
message, so as to eliminate any chances of the message being 
manipulated. The message indeed would not have been 
manipulated if the MAC received from the sender matches the 
MAC generated by the receiver. This provides a simple way 
for verifying message integrity. To ensure MAC computation 
efficiency from both, the sender and receiver side, an efficient 
and high-speed hash function is required [6]. 
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IV. STANDARD HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS 
The most standard hash functions used today are the 
dedicated hash, that is, hash functions that are especially 
designed for hashing purpose only. In this section, we will 
describe the more popular hash functions. 
A. MD5(Message Digest 5) 
MD5 is a popular hash function in the MD family, 
designed by Rives in 1991. This hash function uses the 
Merkle–Damgard construction. The MD5 algorithm outputs a 
128-bit length from an input of an arbitrary length message.  
However, several attacks have been found on MD5. In 1992, 
Bore and Bosselaers found collision attacks usually targeting 
the compression function. In 1996, Dobbertin published the 
fact that collision attacks targeted MD5. Successful collision 
attacks were also reported against MD5 in [8]. The 
improvement of collision  attacks on MD5 were also found in 
previous works [9], [10]. 
B. RIPEMD-160 
It is a well-known hash function in the RIPEMD family, 
designed by Dobbertin, Bosselaers and Perneel in 1996. It is 
part of the international standard ISO/IEC10118-3:2004 of 
dedicated hash functions. It also uses the Merkle-Damgård 
construction. It produces a message digest length of 160 bits 
[11]. However, semifree-start collision, preimage and collision 
attacks on RIPEMD-160 were found in [10]. 
C. Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is a group of hash functions 
published by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology as a US Federal Information Processing Standard 
(FIPS). All of the current SHA algorithms were developed by 
the NSA: 
 SHA-1: NIST (1995) developed the Secure Hash 
Algorithm 1 or SHA-1, which also uses the Merkle–
Damgard construction as MD5, and generates a 160-bit 
message digest for an arbitrary length input message. 
However, collision attack was also founded against 
SHA-1 in previous studies [12]-[14]. Therefore, NIST 
announced the step-by-step elimination of SHA-1 [15]. 
 SHA-2: NIST (2002) added other algorithms to the 
SHA family with respective hash code lengths of 256, 
348, and 512 bits i.e. SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-
512, respectively. These follow the same structure as 
MD5 and SHA-1, but are more complex since a 
nonlinear function is added to the compression 
function. However, SHA-2 is not preferred to ensure 
integrity, as it is not  as time efficient as SHA-1 [16]. 
On the other hand, Bitcoin, as the most popular crypto-
currency, uses SHA256 for Hashcash which provides 
security over transactions made between peers in the 
Bitcoin network. However, SHA-256 has no multi-
threading ability, and thus it is not fast enough for 
transactions [17]. The most recent attacks on SHA-2 
have been shown in previous works [18]. 
 SHA-3: After several successful collision attacks 
which were progressively reduced in complexity (such 
as MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-2), NIST, in the Federal 
Register, announced a public competition to develop 
SHA-3, a completely new hashing algorithm. In 2007, 
the announcement for the initiative was published. 
Then, four years later, on October 2nd, 2012, the 
winner of the competition Keccak, was announced. In 
2014, NIST considered SHA-3 as a standard hash 
function. However, this algorithm is susceptible to first 
collision-finding attacks [19], [20]. On the other hand, 
the algorithm shows relatively low software 
performance compared to other hash functions [21]. 
V. COMPARISON OF STANDARD HASH ALGORITHM 
The comparison of the standard hash algorithm based on 
the general properties, including block size, word size, output 
size, logical operation, and the number of rounds as shown in 
Table I. And also common attacks on these algorithms are 
summarized as illustrated in Table II. 
TABLE I. COMPARISON BETWEEN STANDARD HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS BASED ON PROPERTIES 
 
Properties 
Name of Algorithm 
MD5 
RIPEMD 
-160 
SHA-1 
SHA-2 
256/512 
SHA-3 
256/512 
Block Size 512 bits 
512 
bits 
512 bits 512/1024   bits 1088/576 bits 
Word Size 32 bits 32bits 32bits 32/64 bits 320/320bits 
Output Size 128bits 160 bits 160 bits 256/512 bits 1600/1600bits 
Rounds 18 80 80 64/80 24/24 
Operations 
ADD,XOR, 
AND,OR, 
NOT, 
SHIFT 
 
ADD,, 
ROTATE, 
XOR,AND, 
OR,NOT 
ADD, 
XOR 
AND, OR,NOT, 
ROTATE. 
ADD, 
XOR, 
OR, 
AND SHIFT,, 
ROTATE 
 
 
- 
Construction Merkle-Damgard Merkle-Damgard Merkle-Damgard Merkle-Damgard Sponge 
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TABLE II. COMMON ATTACKS ON STANDARD HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS 
Algorithm Type of attacks Complexity References 
MD5 
Collision 239 Ref [8] 
Fast Collision 218 Ref  [9] 
RIPEM-160 
 Collision 267 Ref [22] 
Preimage 2158.91 Ref [23] 
SHA-1 
Collision < 269 Ref [12] 
Collision 261 Ref [13] 
Freestart Collision - Ref [14] 
SHA-2 
256 Preimage 2255.5 Ref [24] 
512 Preimage 2511.2 Ref [24] 
SHA-3 
256 Practical Collision and near-Collision - Ref [19] 
512 Possibility first Collision - Ref [20] 
From the above discussion, it is found that most of the 
popular hash functions from different families suffer from 
collision attacks and also are not time efficient. As a solution 
to this problem, researchers proposed other algorithms. 
VI. DISCUSSIONS 
Many researchers have proposed their own algorithm in 
order to overcome the above issue as shown in Table III.  In 
this section, the authors have discussed some of the variations 
in hash function algorithms. 
Belfedhal and Faraoun [25] used a variant of the Merkle-
Damgard construction basing off on cellular automata to 
introduce a hash function algorithm producing a 256-bit hash 
value. Although the algorithm yielded good results for 
statistical test, it was not tested against collision and preimage 
attacks. 
Li et al. [26]  used a dynamic S-box to design a chaotic 
hash function that produces 128-bit hash values as the final 
hash code and thus compromising its practicability and 
flexibility lent via the S-box. One major drawback of this 
proposed algorithm is that the length of the hash code is not 
enough to guarantee security against collision or second pre-
image attacks. 
Abdulah et al. [27] developed a new hash function based 
on MD5, generating a 224-bit hash value. Perhaps the most 
serious disadvantage of this development is the time required 
to produce the message digest, which is as much as the MD5, 
meaning that the efficiency is very low. 
Tur and Javurek [28] used neural network to develop hash 
function generation, which produced a 128-bit hash value. 
However, approaches of this kind are very difficult to execute 
besides having a short hash value. 
Ahmad et al. [29] had integrated 2D and 1D chaotic maps 
in the development of a novel hash function scheme, where 
128-bit hash value for an arbitrary length message was 
generated. Nevertheless, the length of the hash value is short 
and thus it is not resistant against collision attacks. 
TABLE III. COMPARISON OF VARIATIONS OF HASH FUNCTION ALGORITHMS 
Author Year of publication Advantages Limitations 
Belfedhal and Faraoun [25] 2015 
It provides good cryptographic 
properties such as pseudo- random 
behavior and sensitivity to the input 
changes. 
It was not tested against attacks that are cryptographic in 
nature e.g., meet-in-the-middle attacks, collision or birthday 
attacks. 
Wang et al.  [31] 2015 It provides variable output. It was not tested against common attacks such as collision. 
Li et al.   [26] 2016 
It has good statistical performance and 
collision resistance. 
Any attacker could launch exhaustive collision attacks on 
the function because the final hash value is 128 bits 
Tur and Javurek       [28] 2016  
Extra modules are still required to enable the proposed 
system to be used as a real application.  
It was not tested against attacks that are cryptographic in 
nature e.g., meet-in-the-middle attacks, collision or birthday 
 Li and Liu  [30] 2016 
The confusion and diffusion property of 
the proposed algorithm hash is good. 
Any attacker could launch exhaustive collision attacks on 
the function because the final hash value is 128 bits.   
Ahmad  et al. [29] 2017 
It has great statistical performance. 
It can generate hash value of length 
160,256 or 512 bits. 
 
 Zhang et al.[2]  2017 
The proposed algorithm satisfies the 
requirement of statistical performance. 
The algorithm is not time efficient to obtain the hash value. 
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Li and Liu [30] used chaotic mapping that is generalized 
and parameters that are variable to propose a hash function. In 
their work, an arbitrary length message was converted to 
corresponding ASCII values in the process of executing 6-unit 
iterations that has variable message values and parameters. 
Towards achieving the final hash value, iteration state values 
were used to cascade extracted bits. Based on a definition of 
the birthday attack, 128-bit hash value is not enough to 
guarantee a secure algorithm. 
Wang et al. [31] proposed a hash algorithm, which 
generated a variable size digest. Their proposed algorithm was 
an improved version of MD-5 algorithm on the output length. 
Although the proposed algorithm has a variable size digest, 
which is good property to increase security, however it still 
uses the same construction as MD5. 
Many researchers have proposed their own hash function 
algorithm as shown in Table III. Some of them were based on 
the chaotic design, with some being based on the complex 
chaotic system, the chaotic neural network, and the chaos tent 
map. Some of the current hash function designs produce a 
hash value size of 128 bits only which is not secure enough 
against collision attacks. Although these algorithms have 
offered satisfactory statistical performances, they are still 
weak in resisting collision attacks. Consequently, it is 
necessary to develop new approaches to hash function 
algorithm design that is able to prevent attacks effectively in 
comparison to existing algorithms as they are not sufficient to 
meet the requirement of latest technologies and security 
concern. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There are various types of hash functions algorithms used 
to ensure the integrity and authentication of messages. Some 
have emerged as the standard, such as MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2 
and SHA-3. This paper discusses these algorithms. It was 
found that most of them are either breakable, or are not time 
efficient. Also, this paper discusses other hash algorithms 
which were presented by researchers, but most of them were 
not tested against attacks that are cryptographic in nature such 
as collision attacks. Therefore, it can be concluded that a hash 
function that is efficient and safe, and fulfills application 
requirements such as data integrity and authenticity, must be 
designed and made into a priority. 
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